About this Symantec Report, read !!
About this Symantec Report, read !!
FinderPop has been reviewed at MacWord by Dan Frankes. You can read the review here. I don’t need to say how happy I am about it ;)
REPOST: Ode to Security Researchers:
After reading some articles (not only: ‘Linux Ignored, Not Immune,’ Says Hacker Contest Sponsor), I have decided to repost a previous entry ;-) In my opinion, the same applies to some journalists, bloggers, software developers, et cetera…
By Martin Pittenauer – 0×2a: Ode to security researchers
“Dear security researchers, that…
• don’t prance around like a pwnie over every 0day
• value responsibility and public interests over your own ego
• have grown up
• don’t complain about people who haven’t, all the time
• understand software development processes and the meaning of “trivial”
• don’t insist on being baby-sitted 24/7 by $BIG_COMPANY
• aren’t at the center of the universe
• can resist making cheap jokes
• have written code worth mentioning, to broaden your horizon
• can make their outcome without having to pimp their personality, sell stuff to questionable characters or use tactics akin to extortion
• face discussion instead of declaring everybody else stupid
• don’t try so very hard to be a cool kid…, I wish there were more of you.”
Well, as an open-mined person, I have decided to transcript this to your consideration…
The WebKit r.31201 is preforming really well. Firefox 3.0b4 also – indeed, it seems that the Mozilla Team have improved their Mac OS X version way a lot. Try it and colabore in their beta test program; they deserve it, maybe, for the first time (not talking about Camino). The same can be said about the WebKit Team downloading the latest nightly buid. And, finaly, Apple has released Safari v3.1. Let’s see some results – nothing definitive but still.
SunSpider JavaScript Benchmark Results:
…
UPDATE:
WebKit achieves Acid3 100/100 in public build (via Surfin’ Safari)
It’s really funny from a non-coder point of view to read -sometimes- some comments… I also say-write very often stupid things. As everyone (do you think that you don’t?) :) So, usually, I only read them and say nothing. But, it can happend that sometimes you couldn’t resist to say something – mainly because it’s… Well, I’ll better shut up and only let you build up your own opinion. My interpretation, as a jurist, it’s not important in this case and it’s not the reason of this post. Whatever it is – and, off course, I have one-. But, as said, this is not the point. The point is that, recently, there are a lot of non-jurist opinions about the so called ‘Misuse of Devices’ – jurist jargon – or, if you want it, ‘black-blue-white hacker tools’ – ‘coders’ jargon. So, just read what follows as an example (there are a lot more):
Comments in: http://rss.slashdot.org/~r/Slashdot/slashdot/~3/157287393/article.pl
After that, read this:
Cybercrime Convention – Council of Europe
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/185.htm
(…)
Article 6 – Misuse of devices
1 Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally and without right:
a the production, sale, procurement for use, import, distribution or otherwise making available of:
i a device, including a computer program, designed or adapted primarily for the purpose of committing any of the offences established in accordance with Articles 2 through 5;
ii a computer password, access code, or similar data by which the whole or any part of a computer system is capable of being accessed,
with intent that it be used for the purpose of committing any of the offences established in Articles 2 through 5; and
b the possession of an item referred to in paragraphs a.i or ii above, with intent that it be used for the purpose of committing any of the offences established in Articles 2 through 5. A Party may require by law that a number of such items be possessed before criminal liability attaches.
2 This article shall not be interpreted as imposing criminal liability where the production, sale, procurement for use, import, distribution or otherwise making available or possession referred to in paragraph 1 of this article is not for the purpose of committing an offence established in accordance with Articles 2 through 5 of this Convention, such as for the authorised testing or protection of a computer system.
3 Each Party may reserve the right not to apply paragraph 1 of this article, provided that the reservation does not concern the sale, distribution or otherwise making available of the items referred to in paragraph 1 a.ii of this article.
(…)
And the “Explanatory Report”
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/185.htm
“(…)
Misuse of devices (Article 6)
71. This provision establishes as a separate and independent criminal offence the intentional commission of specific illegal acts regarding certain devices or access data to be misused for the purpose of committing the above-described offences against the confidentiality, the integrity and availability of computer systems or data. As the commission of these offences often requires the possession of means of access (“hacker tools”) or other tools, there is a strong incentive to acquire them for criminal purposes which may then lead to the creation of a kind of black market in their production and distribution. To combat such dangers more effectively, the criminal law should prohibit specific potentially dangerous acts at the source, preceding the commission of offences under Articles 2 – 5. In this respect the provision builds upon recent developments inside the Council of Europe (European Convention on the legal protection of services based on, or consisting of, conditional access – ETS N° 178) and the European Union (Directive 98/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 1998 on the legal protection of services based on, or consisting of, conditional access) and relevant provisions in some countries. A similar approach has already been taken in the 1929 Geneva Convention on currency counterfeiting.
72. Paragraph 1(a)1 criminalises the production, sale, procurement for use, import, distribution or otherwise making available of a device, including a computer programme, designed or adapted primarily for the purpose of committing any of the offences established in Articles 2-5 of the present Convention. ‘Distribution’ refers to the active act of forwarding data to others, while ‘making available’ refers to the placing online devices for the use of others. This term also intends to cover the creation or compilation of hyperlinks in order to facilitate access to such devices. The inclusion of a ‘computer program’ refers to programs that are for example designed to alter or even destroy data or interfere with the operation of systems, such as virus programs, or programs designed or adapted to gain access to computer systems.
73. The drafters debated at length whether the devices should be restricted to those which are designed exclusively or specifically for committing offences, thereby excluding dual-use devices. This was considered to be too narrow. It could lead to insurmountable difficulties of proof in criminal proceedings, rendering the provision practically inapplicable or only applicable in rare instances. The alternative to include all devices even if they are legally produced and distributed, was also rejected. Only the subjective element of the intent of committing a computer offence would then be decisive for imposing a punishment, an approach which in the area of money counterfeiting also has not been adopted. As a reasonable compromise the Convention restricts its scope to cases where the devices are objectively designed, or adapted, primarily for the purpose of committing an offence. This alone will usually exclude dual-use devices.
74. Paragraph 1(a)2 criminalises the production, sale, procurement for use, import, distribution or otherwise making available of a computer password, access code or similar data by which the whole or any part of a computer system is capable of being accessed.
75. Paragraph 1(b) creates the offence of possessing the items set out in paragraph 1(a)1 or 1(a)2. Parties are permitted, by the last phrase of paragraph 1(b), to require by law that a number of such items be possessed. The number of items possessed goes directly to proving criminal intent. It is up to each Party to decide the number of items required before criminal liability attaches.
76. The offence requires that it be committed intentionally and without right. In order to avoid the danger of overcriminalisation where devices are produced and put on the market for legitimate purposes, e.g. to counter-attacks against computer systems, further elements are added to restrict the offence. Apart from the general intent requirement, there must be the specific (i.e. direct) intent that the device is used for the purpose of committing any of the offences established in Articles 2-5 of the Convention.
77. Paragraph 2 sets out clearly that those tools created for the authorised testing or the protection of a computer system are not covered by the provision. This concept is already contained in the expression ‘without right’. For example, test-devices (‘cracking-devices’) and network analysis devices designed by industry to control the reliability of their information technology products or to test system security are produced for legitimate purposes, and would be considered to be ‘with right’.
78. Due to different assessments of the need to apply the offence of “Misuse of Devices” to all of the different kinds of computer offences in Articles 2 – 5, paragraph 3 allows, on the basis of a reservation (cf. Article 42), to restrict the offence in domestic law. Each Party is, however, obliged to criminalise at least the sale, distribution or making available of a computer password or access data as described in paragraph 1 (a) 2.”
(…)
And, NOW, take your own conclusions, even if you are a non-jurist :)
PS:
§ 202c Vorbereiten des Ausspähens und Abfangens von Daten
(1) Wer eine Straftat nach § 202a oder § 202b vorbereitet, indem er
1. Passwörter oder sonstige Sicherungscodes, die den Zugang zu Daten (§ 202a Abs. 2) ermöglichen, oder
2. Computerprogramme, deren Zweck die Begehung einer solchen Tat ist,
herstellt, sich oder einem anderen verschafft, verkauft, einem anderen überlässt, verbreitet oder sonst zugänglich macht, wird mit Freiheitsstrafe bis zu einem Jahr oder mit Geldstrafe
bestraft.
(2) § 149 Abs. 2 und 3 gilt entsprechend.
Anúncio de Rixstep: Rixstep se complace en anunciar ACP-Académico y Xfile-Académico. Ambos constituyen paquetes especialmente rebajados en su precio, con respecto al ‘ACP’ y al ‘Xfile’ porque están dirigidos a la comunidad académica.
El paquete Xfile constituye una parte del paquete completo ACP -el ‘Apple Core Project’ de Rixstep’-, un proyecto de investigación dirigido a profesionales, lo que no obsta a que los usuários áltamente cualificados también puedan sacar provecho del mismo.
Más infomación en el sitio Rixstep.
Al respecto debo decir que a alguien que sea profesor como yo siempre debería interesarle cualquier cosa que afecte a la llamada comunidad académica. Aunque sólo sea por interés -que no es éste el caso-. Así que, viendo como Rixstep ha decidido rebajar económicamente los precios de sus paquetes de software ACP y Xfile especialmente para la comunidad académica, me ha parecido apropiado recoger aquí el mencionado anúncio. Y, a él, añadir mi anotación. No es que mi opinión cuente mucho pero, por si acaso, ahí va…
Y, para que conste, no tengo ninguna relación directa o indirecta con Rixstep -incluyendo por supuesto la económica-. Simplemente soy un mero usuario del paquete completo (ACP) desde hace tiempo. Un usuario que como ya dije en una entrada anterior en este blog está extremadamente satisfecho de serlo. Imaginaos: ¡¡ no creo haber gastado mejor mi dinero con ningún otro ’software’ para OS X !!.
No sólo es que sea increible, es que además aprendes con él. No creo exagerar si digo que si no lo usas difícilmente puedes saber lo que “realmente” es el OS X. Así mismo, no olvidéis tampoco leer los artículos de la ‘Learning Curve’ -entre muchos otros-.
Así que no puedo sino recomendarlo… Descargadlo, probadlo y judgadlo por vosotros mismos. O, aún mejor, ¡haceros con el paquete completo!
Ambos, tanto en su versión académica como en la que no lo es, en función de si pertenecéis a la comunidad académica o no. Y sí, los estudiantes, pertenecen a ella ;-)
Martin Pittenauer – 0×2a: Ode to security researchers
“Dear security researchers, that…
• don’t prance around like a pwnie over every 0day
• value responsibility and public interests over your own ego
• have grown up
• don’t complain about people who haven’t, all the time
• understand software development processes and the meaning of “trivial”
• don’t insist on being baby-sitted 24/7 by $BIG_COMPANY
• aren’t at the center of the universe
• can resist making cheap jokes
• have written code worth mentioning, to broaden your horizon
• can make their outcome without having to pimp their personality, sell stuff to questionable characters or use tactics akin to extortion
• face discussion instead of declaring everybody else stupid
• don’t try so very hard to be a cool kid
…, I wish there were more of you.”
Well, as an open-mined person, I have decided to transcript this to your consideration…